13 August 2021

Social goals and the Karpman Drama Triangle

I've written about the crippling limitations imposed on Social Policy Bonds by making them non-tradeable here and here. And I'm sometimes asked why Social Policy Bonds haven't yet been issued, either by government or the private sector, whereas their non-tradable variant (most often known as Social Impact Bonds), are now issued in about 25 countries.

My thinking goes like this. Governments and non-governmental organisations including charities, do not want to relinquish their power to decide who shall supply the goal-achieving services (and so benefit from redeeming the bonds). Nor do they wish to lose complete oversight over how the targeted goals shall be achieved. Ultimately, in my view, it's about power and control, which to many of us are not key drivers, so we may find it difficult to understand their potency. This also, and more disappointingly, applies to philanthropists as well as politicians: it is gratifying to be seen to be granting funds directly to beneficiaries or to people who help those beneficiaries. It is not so appealing merely to contribute to a fund whose eventual beneficiaries cannot be identified. As well, Social Policy Bonds are best deployed when they aim to achieve long-term goals and on a large scale, where the beneficiaries are even less easy to identify and, indeed, might not yet be born.

Another explanation is that, at some level, governments, foundations and philanthropists might be playing the role of Rescuer in what is known as the "Karpman Drama Triangle", involving a Victim, Persecutor and Rescuer, as modelled in transactional analysis. Perhaps this paragraph, from here is pertinent in some cases:

The Rescuer: The rescuer's line is "Let me help you." A classic enabler, the Rescuer feels guilty if they don't go to the rescue. Yet their rescuing has negative effects: It keeps the Victim dependent and doesn't allow the Victim permission to fail and experience the consequences of their choices. The rewards derived from this rescue role are that the focus is taken off of the rescuer. When they focus their energy on someone else, it enables them to ignore their own anxiety and issues. This rescue role is also pivotal because their actual primary interest is really an avoidance of their own problems disguised as concern for the victim’s needs.
I had hoped that SIBs would be stepping stone on the way to Social Policy Bonds. That is still possible, and new technologies are generating are encouraging more interest in my original concept. However, it is also possible that the lack of evidence (pdf) justifying the SIBs that have been issued could discredit the whole bond concept. We shall see. 

2 comments:

Gideon said...

I've been reading up on your concept of Social Policy Bonds and am very intrigued. I couldn't find another more appropriate way to reach you, so I will just ask this question here as it seems to be a fundamental blocker for me.

What happens in the event that the terms of the bond are not met. There is no redemption of the bond, I understand, but what happens to all that capital?

Thanks for sticking with this interesting idea all these years. It's very intriguing.

Ronnie Horesh said...

Hi Gideon

Thanks for your message. I can be reached via the email address given on this page: https://www.socialgoals.com/blog-contact.html.

It will be interesting to see how successful will be the marriage of the bonds to the blockchain.

Now to your query. The backers of bonds that target goals that just aren't being achieved can (1) do nothing, and watch the value of the bonds fall to virtually zero, at which point someone might buy them and do some small thing that advances the goal, and so benefit from the value of their bonds multiplying. The issuers could also hope for improvements in technology or knowledge or both (depending on the goal) that would reduce the cost of achieving the goal, so making the bonds a more attractive investment. But what if the bonds are almost without any value, and still nothing happens? Then the issuers could (2) top up the redemption funds. They could either issue more bonds, or simply undertake to redeem the bonds already in circulation for (1 + x) times the redemption value quoted when they were issued. (I describe this in Chapter 3 of my book, and also here: https://www.socialgoals.com/world-peace.html - scroll down to the section headed 'Efficient costing'.) In all this time, the redemption funds could be in an escrow account. Note that the topping up of redemption funds, or the issuing of more bonds, could be done using sources other than, or in addition to, the original backers, who could, for instance appeal to the public to supplement the initial funds.