This is the first draft of the third chapter of a book I'm writing on World Peace Bonds. It is quite long. I will make all chapters freely available for download as pdfs once the book is finished. Comments are welcome.
Chapter 3: World Peace Bonds: an overview
This
chapter describes a new financial instrument, World Peace Bonds, designed to
inject market incentives into the elimination of violent political conflict.
World Peace Bonds
World
Peace Bonds would be issued by a trusted financial institution. Funds for their
redemption would be raised by a combination of governments, charitable bodies, non-governmental
organisations, corporations, philanthropists and ordinary citizens – anyone, in
short, with a genuine interest in peace. These would be the backers of the
bonds: those who contribute funds for their redemption. The bonds would be
issued on the open market and would become redeemable for a fixed sum only
when the goal of world peace had been reached and sustained for a defined
period, which I envisage to be at least thirty years. The targeted outcome of
world peace would be rigorously defined, most probably in terms of an array of
quantifiable elements, each of which would have to fall into a specified range
before the bonds could be redeemed. Importantly, the bonds would make no
assumptions as to how to minimise conflict—that would be left to bondholders.
Normal
bonds are redeemable at a fixed date, for a fixed sum, and so yield a fixed
rate of interest. World Peace Bonds would not bear interest and their
redemption date would be uncertain. Bondholders would gain most by ensuring
that the targeted elements of world peace were being achieved quickly. (Unless
otherwise stated, hereafter ‘bonds’ refer to World Peace Bonds, rather than
conventional bonds.)
The
backers of the bonds, with the help of the United Nations, academic bodies, non-governmental
organisations and charities, would collectively decide on the exact
specification of the world peace goal. The bonds would be issued by open
tender, as at an auction; those who bid the highest price for the limited
number of bonds would be successful in buying them. Each bond would become
redeemable for, say, $1 billion once the targeted level of peace, as certified
by objective measurements made by independent bodies, had been achieved and
sustained. Once issued, the bonds would be freely tradable.
Assume
that World Peace Bonds, each redeemable for $1 billion, had been issued, and
that they each sold for $100 million. People, or institutions, now hold an
asset that gave them a return of 900 percent once the targeted peace level had
been achieved. It is the prospect of this capital gain that would give
bondholders a powerful incentive to do what they can to prevent and end deadly
conflicts, and to do so as cost-effectively as possible.
Once
issued the bonds would be freely tradable on the open market.
Governments—including those currently engaged in deadly conflicts—might decide
to buy World Peace Bonds. So too might non-governmental militant organisations
and others who are currently financing violence. Or the issuers might give the
bonds to certain of these bodies as a form of aid. Ownership of World Peace
Bonds would enable these bodies to reap financial rewards by ceasing to foment
conflict. They could do by taking on new roles that they have not even
considered because they have had no incentive to do so.
But World
Peace Bonds, being tradable on the open market, could be bought by other
institutions or individuals at any time until redemption. Whenever potential
investors in the bonds thought they could reduce conflict more effectively than
current bondholders, then they would be in a position to offer more than the
current market value of the bonds to the existing bondholders, and buy them.
The financial costs of failing to reach the required target would be borne by
bondholders, rather than those contributing to the redemption funds.
Bondholders
would have the means, motive and opportunity then to use their own capital, or
borrow on the strength of the redemption value of their bond holdings, or on
the strength of any increase in the value of their bonds, to support projects
that will prevent, or lower the level of violent conflict.
Note that
the bond mechanism would be helped by the support and participation of
governments or organisations actually engaged in conflict, but it would not
rely on such support. The bonds might give rise to new, specialist
organisations devoted to minimising violent political conflict as
cost-effectively as possible. These organisations could use their anticipated
capital gains from bondholding to finance those people or organisations,
whether or not they are active participants in conflict, who could do most to
build peace.
What would
determine the price of the bonds? Most obviously, the market’s assessment of
how close the peace target were to being achieved. The bonds would sell for
small fractions of their issue price if people thought there were virtually no
chance of world peace being achieved in their lifetime. People would differ in
their valuation of the bonds, and their views would change as events occurred
that made achievement of the targeted peace objective a more or less remote
prospect. But the bonds, once issued, would be transferable at any time.
Bondholders, having contributed to a lessening of the conflict, would see the
value of their bonds rise. They could then sell their bonds and realise a
capital gain.
The market
prices of World Peace Bonds would be publicly quoted, just like those of
ordinary bonds or shares. These prices would change over time, depending mainly
on the market’s perception of the likelihood and timing of the world peace goal
being achieved. (Expected returns from other financial instruments will also be
a factor.) The bond price, and its changes over time, would be a source of
information that would help those allocating conflict-reducing resources to do
so as effectively as possible - this feature is discussed in the next chapter.
The importance of the long term
Peace in
the short term can signify nothing more than a temporary lull in overt
hostilities, giving opposing sides time to accumulate more weaponry and continue
to intensify hatred of each other. A temporary cessation of conflict could just
be the precursor to an explosion of hostilities later on. But, a decades-long
absence of conflict could be qualitatively different, in that it would help
bring about a warm peace – difficult to quantify and define, but achievable
simply because, with a long time horizon, bondholders would invest in, and
benefit from generational changes in education, media influence, and the
possibilities of forgiveness. Bondholders, in working towards a decades-long
peace, could create a warm peace. Not always – Egypt and Israel have had
a long period of peace marred by some degree of antipathy but even so, simply because
of the length of that peace, war is less likely to occur: the military’s
mindset and capabilities have atrophied over time.
Whatever
holders of World Peace Bonds do, they will have successes and failures. But
they will also have incentives to terminate projects that are failing and to
refine and replicate their successes - to be efficient, in other words.
Government has no such direct incentive. It rarely offers direct financial
rewards for success, and its talent pool is limited, partly for that reason. It
has a short-term focus, too often resorting to military action, and it would
get into trouble if it advocated things like intermarriage, or sponsored
sybaritic retirement for the world’s warmongers. Its actions tend to be
one-size-fits-all, slow to adapt and advocated mainly because they have been
done before, rather than because of their putated efficiency: government will
always prefer approaches with which it’s familiar over innovative, promising,
and successful initiatives that entail relinquishing some of their powers.
The field
of conflict is one area where the private sector can and should be given the
chance to operate more freely on the side of peace. Sadly, it is largely
private, short-term incentives - to arms dealers, the military, politicians and
fanatics - that keep conflict going. A well-funded bond regime with a long-term
perspective would redress the balance.
Under a World
Peace Bond regime, government could still play a role in defining our peace
goal and raising some of the revenue for its achievement but, rather than wait
for that to happen, the private sector could have to take the initiative. That
could mean a combination of NGOs, interested corporations, charitable
organisations, philanthropists and ordinary citizens. Probably all of these,
with perhaps some government backing, would be needed to raise sufficient
funding. A well-crafted issue of World Peace Bonds should gather support from a
wide range of players: sustained world peace would benefit every person on the
planet.
What to target?
The
precise definition of World Peace Bonds’ goals is crucial.
The bonds
could target a Conflict Index comprising a wide range of indicators of conflict
and peace simultaneously, over the entire world. An index could comprise
various components including:
- Number of direct and indirect deaths resulting
from armed conflict.
- Numbers of refugees fleeing armed conflict areas.
- Military spending, on both materiel and
personnel.
- Numbers of people in the military.
These
individual components would all be targeted simultaneously and all have to fall
within a specified range for a sustained period before the bonds would be
redeemed. None of these components is simple to measure, so all would need to
be carefully thought through, but that should not deter us from trying. The main
focus could be on obvious, undeniable conflicts, where numbers killed directly
can be relatively easily estimated; an example would be the war between Ukraine
and Russia.
Key
criteria are that components of a targeted conflict-reduction objective should:
- Represent, when targeted, ends in themselves, or
be strongly and inextricably correlated with such ends, and
- Be possible to measure objectively, reliably and
accurately.
These
criteria will have some bearing on whether the goal of world peace is too
ambitious, at least at first.
Variants
World
Peace Bonds are
the most ambitious variant of the application of the underlying bond principle.
Because the scope of World Peace Bonds is so wide, it might appeal less to
potential backers than more focused variants. As well, monitoring the progress
toward achievement of world peace could be more difficult than for more
focussed variants described below, depending on how the peace outcome is
specified. It might be that one of those variants could be ideal as first
application of the bond principle; a stepping stone toward the ultimate goal of
world peace.
Regional
Peace Bonds or
bonds focusing on any region. Such bonds aimed at reducing conflict in a
particular region would require less funding than World Peace Bonds and so are
more likely to gain backing from those with an interest in that region.
Conflicts would be easier to monitor for the region than for the entire world.
The bonds could be issued for different continents or regions, with different
targeted definitions of peace to suit local conditions. For instance, bonds
targeting peace in the Middle East could readily target numerical indicators of
dead and injured, as these figures are well-documented in comparison to other
conflicts. In regions where casualty numbers are unreliable, other indicators
would have to be targeted. These could encompass quality of life indicators,
such as literacy, or the numbers of people moving across certain boundaries, or
the value of weapons purchased by potential participants in conflict. Or
conflict-related deaths could be estimated through demographic analyses of
census data before and after conflicts, or through indirect mortality
measurements such as survey questions on survival of siblings, parents, or
spouses. When appropriate, targets could
be specified on the basis of random sampling of populations, with such
components as 'proportion of interviewees who have lost one family member to
violence' used, rather than unreliable aggregate casualty figures.
Nuclear
Peace Bonds would
be the easiest to monitor. Redemption could be conditional on there being no
use of a nuclear device that kills more than, say 500 people. They could also aim
to eliminate all testing of nuclear devices.
Defined
end point: World
Peace Bonds could have a time limit, such that if the defined goal isn’t
reached by a certain specified date, their redemption value decreases.
Variable
redemption value:
the escrow account into which redemption funds are placed can be swelled by
further contributions. Instead of each bond being redeemable for a fixed sum,
it could be redeemable for a fixed proportion of the funds at the time of
redemption. One example: a group of governments or philanthropists could get
the ball rolling by contributing to a redemption fund, then ask ordinary
citizens to add to the total.
Which
variant is chosen will depend mostly on the views of those who back the bonds,
and how much backing the bonds attract.
Paying for peace
Before
each issue of World Peace Bonds, the bonds’ backers would have to decide
approximately on the maximum they would be prepared to pay to see the targeted
outcome achieved. Some backers, especially governments, might be primarily
interested in the financial benefits of sustained peace. If world peace were
being targeted, most governments would, ideally, contribute to the redemption
funds, perhaps in proportion to their Gross Domestic Product. If reductions in
a regional conflict were targeted, governments and private-sector bodies in, or
adjacent to, that region would probably be the largest backers.
Even if
the full benefits could not be achieved until several decades had elapsed, bondholders
would benefit from progress toward that goal. Peace, most would agree, is a
worthwhile goal independent of its economic or, seldom mentioned in the
literature but increasingly significant, its environmental benefits.[i] We should be aiming to
eliminate the human cost of violent political conflict, even though it resists
quantification. Indeed, estimating any of the benefits from conflict reduction
is going to be problematic but, fortunately, those backing a World Peace Bond
issue need not be overly precise in their calculations. They could start by
issuing bonds redeemable for as much as they can reasonably afford to spend on
reducing any particular conflict. From then on, much of the work necessary to
quantify any reduction in conflict per dollar outlay would be done by bidders
for World Peace Bonds on the open market.
To see
this, assume again that bonds were to be used exclusively in pursuit of a 50
per cent reduction in some targeted measure of conflict, and that one thousand World
Peace Bonds are issued, each redeemable for $1 billion once this measure had
halved and sustained. If the market decided that the issue value of each of
these bonds were $100 million, then the net cost to the backers of achieving
the targeted objective (ignoring administration costs and inflation) would be
$900 billion. In other words, the market at the time of issue believes that the
cost, including its profit margin, of achieving the objective would be $900
billion.
But
suppose the bond issuers are in the dark about how much it will cost to achieve
a targeted objective and instead of issuing 1000 bonds they issue 10 000,
each with the same redemption value of $1 billion. They would then be liable
for a maximum cost of $10 000 billion ($10 trillion). However, the market
would still reckon that it could achieve the targeted objective for around $900
billion. So instead of valuing the bonds at $100 million each, it would
bid up the issue price of each bond to around $910 million. The upshot of this is that the backers of
the bonds would not have to estimate with any accuracy how much a targeted
objective might cost to achieve, and they would put a cap on their total
liability by limiting the number of bonds issued.
So the World
Peace Bond mechanism would ensure that the market, rather than a handful of
experts, decides roughly how
much it would cost to reach a specified reduction in the level of violent
political conflict. Participants in the market would do this when they bid for
the bonds at issue and at all times afterwards. This fact, and the would-be
bondholders’ incentive to minimise their costs, contrast with the current
system in which the costs of reducing conflict, if they are calculated at all,
are not widely known nor subject to competitive bidding. Under the current
system, in fact, many of the organisations charged with reducing conflict have
subtle incentives to inflate the costs of their doing so. They will not do this
maliciously, and might not even do so deliberately, but it is probably fair to
say that they are unlikely to be allocating their conflict-reduction resources
with maximum efficiency simply because their livelihoods depend on their not
doing so.
Note that
the bonds’ backers could add to the redemption funds after floating at any time
if it wanted to boost the efforts going into the reduction of worldwide
conflict. They could do so from their own resources, or seek funding from
others.
Getting governments on board
While the
prime motivation for those backing the bonds would be the benefit to humanity,
governments could have a more pecuniary interest. Depending on which governments
are contributing to the bonds’ redemption funds, and which area of (potential)
conflict they are targeting, they might well be interested in financial benefit
they might gain by reducing conflict. A significant reduction in worldwide or
regional conflict could allow the governments backing the bonds to divert
spending away from the military and toward more edifying social or
environmental services, or to lighten the tax burden on their populations.
Added to this, though, would be the indirect financial benefits to
participating governments (and others) who backed a Peace Bond issue. Even if
these governments did not envisage any reduction in their own military spending
as a result of a reduced level of conflict, their economies could benefit
financially from the greater political stability of their region. If, for
example, some countries found it possible to reduce their military expenditure,
their economies could grow, their imports would increase, and the rewards to
bond backers in other countries could take the form of expanded exports.
What could bondholders do?
Some
people might buy World Peace Bonds as they would a lottery ticket, or a
publicly quoted company share. They would think that their bonds’ value might
rise even if they did nothing to help achieve peace. Such passive investors
would want to become ‘free-riders’ hoping to benefit from any increase in the
bond price without actually participating in any peace-building activities. But
the way markets work would limit the opportunities for this sort of investor.
The more bonds these would-be free riders collectively owned, the more remote
the targeted lower level of conflict would become, and so the more they would
stand to lose as the aggregate value of their bond holdings fell. (A fuller discussion of free
riding appears in chapter 5.) At some point, then, it would become worthwhile
for these passive investors either to become, or to sell their bonds to, active
investors.
Active
investors would finance initiatives aimed at ending conflict. They could use
their own capital, or borrow on the strength of the redemption value of their World
Peace Bonds, or on the strength of any potential increase in the value of their
bonds, to support projects that help reduce political violence. They would have
every incentive to co-operate with each other to help achieve the targeted
peace objective, and to do so as cost-effectively as possible. Their motivation
would arise from the expected capital gain they would experience as the value
of their bonds rose in line with the enhanced probability of the early
reduction of targeted conflicts.
The lower
the targeted level of political conflict the more likely bondholders would be
to undertake projects that would pay off only in the long term. It would be
unsatisfactory to achieve a low level of violence just for a short period. The
ultimate objective is a sustained low level of political violence, and that is
how the targeted objective must be specified. \
Bondholders
could work to influence governments, including those of countries that supply
the weapons that fuel conflicts. They could try to influence financial
supporters of conflicts to redirect their funding into less malevolent activities.
Bondholders
could also lobby, or work with, governments to, say, give a higher priority to
peace studies in schools, but they could also develop peace-teaching projects
of their own. While immediate peace might not result, much more could be done
to enhance the prospect of peace in the future. Bondholders could, for
instance, make strenuous efforts in conflict-ridden regions to have some mixed
classes of children of different nationalities, religion or ethnic origin at
kindergarten and school. They could finance sports matches between opposing
sides of current or potential conflicts. They could promote anti-war messages
on social media or set up exchange schemes for children or students of opposing
sides. They could arrange for the most virulent warlords and preachers of hate
to take one-way, first-class journeys to luxurious holidays in remote resorts
with limited access to communication facilities. They might even subsidise
intermarriage between members of different nationalities, tribes or religious
communities.
Bondholders
would be open to trying out these and other trust-building and conflict
prevention measures that would be viewed with suspicion when undertaken by
officially approved bodies.
They could
lobby western governments to improve trade access to poorer countries, or
promote foreign direct investment into, conflict-ridden regions, so as to give
the populations of these countries some means of becoming prosperous other than
by plunder. Economic development would give people a chance to build trust and
take a stake in a peaceful future and a better life for their children-a chance
that many regimes still deny to their own people. It could open the eyes of
people to the virtues and rewards economic growth and give them stakes in a
brighter future. But, as we saw above,[ii] economic growth can also
make conflict more likely: bondholders would have continuous incentives
to look for instances where that is happening, and to follow alternative
conflict prevention measures where it is.
There are
plenty of other activities that bondholders could support, including such
mundane measures as promoting adherence to international treaties and laws, and
improving data collection on violence. These are only examples, of course,
though they do illustrate the potential for those in authority to undertake
peace-building initiatives that they currently cannot, or do not want to,
consider. In reality, bondholders would be likely to undertake a range of
initiatives, the precise nature of which need not be known in advance.
It would be up to bondholders to decide on those programmes that would give
them the best return for each dollar they spend, and this means they would look
for and put into action ways of achieving peace that they believe will be most
effective.
Many NGOS
and aid organisations already pursue some of these activities but they typically
operate on a small scale and are underfunded in relation to the tasks required
to ensure long-lasting peace. Under a bond regime bondholders would have
powerful incentives to divert funding into the most promising of these
activities, or into existing or new conflict-reduction projects, regardless of
who is carrying them out: the sole criterion would be the likely conflict
reduction achieved per dollar spent.
An
ambitious conflict-reduction target would encourage bondholders to undertake
indirect activities that have a long-term payoff. They could divert more funds
into existing efforts at poverty reduction, improved governance and the
strengthening of the rule of law. There is an emerging, though not unanimous
consensus that democratic forms of governance are conducive to certain public
goods including not only peace, but also human rights and economic development.
So bondholders might lobby governments to rule fairly and to represent all
segments of their population in a reasonably equitable manner. Such efforts could
help diminish the appeal of extremist views that can lead to terrorism.[iii]
Other
activities could be undertaken in regions already torn by conflict, and that
could erupt in violence again. These could include the disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, considered crucial to
achieving lasting peace after conflict.[iv] Bondholders could encourage the
inclusion of DDR programmes in peace agreements, and help finance
rehabilitation and re-insertion packages for ex-combatants. They can forestall
future conflict by helping ensure that all ex-combatants are treated equally regardless
of former affiliations.[v]
Trading the bonds
World
Peace Bonds, once floated, must be readily tradable at any time until
redemption. The operation of such a ‘secondary market’ would be critical to the
working of the bond mechanism. Many bond purchasers would want, or need, to
sell their bonds before redemption, which might be a long time in the future.
With a secondary market, these holders would be able to realise any capital
appreciation experienced by their holdings of World Peace Bonds whenever they
chose to do so. Tradability would make the bonds a more attractive investment
in the first place.
As the
bonds were traded, they would tend to flow towards those who would be most able
to help reduce the targeted components of conflict. In fact, though, an actual
flow of bonds would not be necessary. Large bondholders might decide to
subcontract out the required work to many different agents, while they
themselves could hold the bonds from issue to redemption. The important point
is that the bond mechanism would ensure that the people who allocate the
finance for conflict-reducing projects had an incentive to do so efficiently
and to reward successful outcomes, rather than merely to pay people for
undertaking activities. At the limit we can conceive of just one single buyer
of all the bonds. If this buyer were determined to hold on to the bonds until redemption,
then the bonds would function as a sort of performance-related contract, with
the backers paying only when the objective had been achieved. The buyer could
contract out most or all of the work required to achieve the objective, with
the incentives given by the World Peace Bonds for speedy accomplishment
cascading down from the bondholder to those subcontracted to do carry out
conflict reduction.
Too large
a number of small bondholders could probably do little to help achieve peace by
themselves. If there were many small holders, it is likely that the value of
their bonds would fall until there were aggregation of holdings by people or
institutions large enough to initiate effective peace-building projects. As
with shares in newly privatised companies the world over, World Peace Bonds
would mainly end up in the hands of large holders—be they individuals or
institutions. Between them, these large holders would probably acquire the
majority of the bonds. Even these bodies might not be big enough, by
themselves, to achieve much without the co-operation of each other. They might
also resist initiating projects until they were assured that other holders
would not be free riders. So there would be a powerful incentive for all
bondholders to co-operate with each other to help bring about peace. They would
share the same interest in seeing targeted objectives achieved quickly. So they
would share information, trade bonds with each other and collaborate on
conflict-quelling projects. They would also set up payment systems to ensure
that people, bondholders or not, were mobilised to help build peace.
Bondholders would either trade bonds or make incentive payments to ensure that
any proceeds from higher bond prices, or from redemption, would be channelled
in ways most likely to reduce conflict. Large bondholders, in co-operation with
each other, would be able to set up such systems cost-effectively.
Most of our social and
environmental goals are the responsibility of organisations, be they large or
small, public- or private-sector. Much of their energy is, in my view, devoted
to self-perpetuation; so much so that, for our chronic social problems in
general, and for war in particular, I believe a new sort of organisation is
required. World Peace Bonds could lead to the creation of such an organisation.
How would this happen? Consider
what people buying bonds targeting world peace might do. They would want to see
some appreciation of the value of their World Peace Bonds even if they have no intention of
holding on to them until the long-term target of sustained world peace has been
achieved. While they would have competed against each in the market to buy
their bonds, they would quickly see that their bonds will lose value unless
they can, tacitly or otherwise, collude with other bondholders to help achieve
our peace objective. Their interests would be best served by setting up systems
to vet potential conflict-reduction projects and to oversee existing ones.
Importantly, too, they would set up payments systems, so that those working to
achieve world peace are paid according to their contribution toward that goal.
The bondholders themselves might
run this organisation but it would differ from conventional organisations in
that composition (bondholders) could be constantly changing. If it decided to
employ more-permanent staff members to oversee some or all aspects of the work being
done to bring about peace, that would be done only if it would help accelerate
achievement of that goal. There need be no such body: that would be up to
bondholders themselves. At every level of decision-making, the over-arching
concern would be efficiency: the maximisation of peace-achievement per dollar
spent. Under the bond regime the structure, composition and activities of everybody
from bondholders, any oversight organisation they might set up, down to
contractors and subcontractors would be entirely subordinated to the efficient,
rapid achievement of sustained world peace.
Give
greed a chance
Bondholders
might not have to be terribly sophisticated in their choice of projects. World
Peace Bonds would work on the principle that both bondholders and the people
whom they pay (whether as contractors or as recipients of, to put it bluntly,
bribes) are highly motivated by financial incentives. Chapter 1 mentioned the
conflicts in Lebanon, whose economic dimension has generally been
underestimated. There are other cases, as complex as Lebanon in which economic
incentives, while not a root cause, can prolong conflict.[vi]
In Sudan and west Africa currently (2025) internal wars are
prolonged by competition for natural resources—oil, gold, diamonds,
minerals—with armed groups and state actors alike seeking to exploit the chaos
for financial enrichment, often at the expense of civilians.[vii] In
conflicts such as these, bondholders might be able to reduce conflict quite
directly and unsubtly simply by making appropriate financial transfers to
certain individuals.
Bidders
for the bonds could invest any sum they choose in the bonds. If their bond
holdings are small, they might not be able then individually to do much about
achieving peace, and most likely their bonds would be bought up by larger
players. But derivatives in the bonds could magnify the opportunities to, for
example, corporations that currently benefit from armament sales or private
militias: they could buy call options or futures in the bonds; their holdings could
moderate their opposition to conflict-reduction activities, or serve as
insurance against serious reductions in military spending.
Under a
bond regime, bidding for the right to benefit financially from
conflict-reduction would not be limited to a few likely operators, but would be
open to all who are prepared to undertake, or to finance the undertaking of,
projects that would help achieve the targeted objective. And it would be open
continuously, from the time the bonds were issued until the time they were
redeemed.
This
continuous opportunity to buy and sell what are, in effect, fractions of the
contract to achieve sustained world peace (or derivatives in the bonds) would imply
a liquid market for the bonds; their prices being openly quoted would, as we
shall see in the next chapter, generate information of great value to a broad
range of decision makers.
[iii]
Responding to terrorism: what role for the United Nations? International
Peace Academy, report of a conference held on 25-26 October 2002, New York.
[iv]
A Framework for lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of
former combatants in crisis situations, IPA-UNDP
Workshop Report, 12-13 December 2002, New York.
