14 June 2020

Who really cares?

The problem with the worldwide protests is simple to state, difficult to solve: giving power to the people who say they'll help groups X and Y doesn't actually help people in groups X and Y. This is one of the few constants of history.

And that is even with the assumption that the leaders or spokespeople for these groups actually mean what they say, and care about the people they purport to represent. I have my doubts about the leaders of the current protests but, even if we assume their good intentions, the probability that they, or the people who shove them aside once their bid for power succeeds, can or will do anything to help their constituency is low. This is not a party political view: just a statement of fact. From the current US President's base to the idealists who fomented revolution in France or Russia...the gap between hopes and reality is wide and deep. There is very little correlation between the stated goals of people wanting power and the post-election or post-revolutionary facts.

Social Policy Bonds, at first sight, might seem a wacky solution to the problems we are all facing. I mean not only such global problems as climate change and threats of nuclear catastrophe, but also problems such as the systemic, self-reinforcing inequalities, between and within countries that should be unacceptable in their own right, as well as posing a threat to democratic political and economic systems that are the least worst in human history, when it comes to maximising the chances of a decent life for the largest number of people.

Social Policy Bonds? A new financial instrument? As if there aren't already enough ways in which the financial sector has invented new ways of obscuring the ways in which it syphons off resources - including some of the world's best mathematical brains - from the rest of society, for its own selfish purposes.

But Social Policy Bonds would be different. Yes, they would use the market's incentives and efficiencies, but they would be doing so to achieve society's goals. Their use of markets is secondary to their first essential element: that of clarifying and targeting our social and environmental goals.A Social Policy Bond regime doesn't need to take an opinion on the more controversial and divisive aspects of policy: how our goals shall be achieved or who shall achieve them. That would be left to investors in the bonds who would be rewarded exactly according to how successful they are in achieving our goals. Under a Social Policy Bond regime, politicians wouldn't be able to obscure the workings of government by making arcane, protracted,self-serving decisions about regulation, or institutional structures and funding—procedures that, you might think, are specifically designed to deter anyone other than powerful interests and their paid agents from following. On the contrary, Social Policy Bonds would target outcomes that are meaningful to ordinary people. On the national level these would include improved health, reduced crime rates, universal literacy. On the global level, the bonds could target nuclear peace, the prevention and mitigation of all kinds of disaster including adverse climatic events or, again universal literacy. The point is that these would be society's goals. Goals that are comprehensible and meaningful; goals that all can help in formulating and prioritising.

It is this aspect of Social Policy Bonds—the articulation and prioritising of our social and environmental goals—that needs to be emphasised if they are going to become acceptable, just as much as their use of markets which, rightly in many cases, have been discredited by their manipulation and subversion to the benefit of the already powerful. After thirty-plus years of advocating Social Policy Bonds, I remain hopeful. Well, put it this way: I certainly can't be hopeful about any of the other policymaking systems currently on offer.
anising society currently on offer.

12 June 2020

Crime and alternatives to Punishment

The Economist writes:
Although the general call for "defunding" risks a backlash, the details of redirecting part of the police budget to arms of local government, such as housing or mental health, may make sense. The power of protest and the legacy of George Floyd, the 'Economist' dated 13 June
Right. The best way of dealing with crime, is not necessarily to give more money to the police, or to imprison more people, or to impose more drastic punishments. By 'to deal with crime' I mean: to reduce the crime rate. That is a goal that, I think, most of us can agree on. Other supposed goals are nothing more than surrogate indicators, or the product of sorrow, or anger, or revenge psychology. But if we accept that our goal is to reduce the crime rate, and admit the truth: that we don't have a clue how best to do so...well that is a good starting point.

We don't have a clue because the causes of crime vary from place to place, from person to person, from time to time. The best way of reducing crime in some small town might be to subsidise small businesses - which might be a lot cheaper and less divisive than beefing up the local police force. In another area, at a different time, the most efficient way of reducing crime might be to install surveillance cameras, or lay on free taxis for youths leaving nightclubs, or provide talking therapies rather than antipsychotic medication.... The problem we have is not only that the causes of crime are too complex and dynamic for any single organisation to address. It's that there is no incentive for anybody to take such a broad approach. Everybody—politicians, the police, psychiatrists—has their own agenda. Well meaning, hard working these people may be, but they are not rewarded for their success in dealing with a major social problem. It's far too complicated for any single organisation to deal with. We need diverse, adaptive approaches.

My suggestion is that we apply the Social Policy Bond concept to crime. A short essay on how to do this appears here. The paradigm fits other social and environmental problems. The first task is to clarify and articulate exactly what outcome we are looking to achieve. Because we are not concerned with how our goals shall be achieved, nor with who shall achieve them, we can target long-term goals that have eluded past efforts at achieving them, such as world peace or universal literacy or, indeed, reduced crime rates. The role of government would be to articulate society's goals and raise the revenue to achieve them. But the actual achievement of complex social goals should be done by a coalition of people who are motivated to find the most efficient solution, regardless of how many vested interests they have to undermine to do so. And that is where Social Policy Bonds enter the picture.

To read more, please go to the Social Policy Bonds site. All my papers and book chapters are available there and can be downloaded for no charge.

26 May 2020

An honest politician

An honest politician or Why we need to target outcomes

Michael Lind quotes Jean-Claude Juncker.
Jean-Claude Juncker, the prime minister of the tax haven Luxembourg who became the president of the European Commission from 2014 to 2019, described how the European Council systematically expanded its authority by stealth: We decree something, then float it and wait some time to see what happens. If no clamor occurs . . . because most people do not grasp what had been decided, we continue—step by step, until the point of no return is reached. Michael Lind, in an excerpt from his book The New Class War, quoted here.
The quote goes a long way to explaining the wide, and widening, gap between politicians and the people they are supposed to represent. Our policymaking system is just too complex, protracted and boring for anyone other than powerful people, or their paid lobbyists, to follow and influence. That means, on the one side of the gap: politicians, bureaucrats and big business. And on the other, ordinary people and small businesses.

We are not heading toward a more simplified policymaking system. Society and the environment are not becoming easier for the public to comprehend. The trend is toward more complexity and, therefore, more opportunity for powerful interests to influence policy in their favour. The world economy might shrink as a result of, say, the pandemic, or climate change, or some other disaster. But there no indication that the rich and powerful will voluntarily relinquish any of their share. The future, then, might seem to be bleak: even greater inequality and, quite possibly, mass impoverishment.

I suggest that one way of avoiding such a miserable scenario is to re-orientate policymaking in such a way that most of us can understand it. Our current systems emphasise personality, image, spending pledges, legislation and organisational structures.These have in common one thing: they have nothing to do with outcomes that are meaningful to ordinary people.

Social Policy Bonds are a possible way in which we can express our policy goals in ways that people can understand and, in so doing, participate in their formulation and setting their relative priorities. So, for instance, rather than look at the sums spent on a health service, or at the numbers of people tested (or 'tested' - some of the results are spurious) for covid-19, or the quantity of protective (or 'protective'...) equipment acquired by a country, or other micro-targets, we would focus on the health of citizens, and target that for improvement. Social Policy Bonds would work by contracting out the achievement of our health goals to the market - which would include government bodies, so long as they are efficient. But the important first step would be to define our health goals, and let investment flow according to our health targets. My piece here gives more detail.

The great advantages of Social Policy Bonds are twofold. One, the market will reward only the most efficient approaches to achieving society's health goals. Two, a bond regime would require that we have explicit, transparent, broad, long-term goals that would be understood, and contributed to, by any members of the public who wish to get involved. That, perhaps even more than greater efficiency, would be a worthwhile benefit. It would certainly help avoid the cynicism of a Juncker, and the outrage that his world view—widespread I am sure among our leaders—ought to elicit.

17 May 2020

The Coronovirus Bailout alternative: how it might work

My previous post was a letter published in the Financial Times, which suggested that instead of disbursing covid-19 bailout funds to businesses, the UK Government could instead issue coupons to people entitling them to spend the equivalent per capita sum in particular expenditure categories. Here I will sketch out some broad outlines as to how this scheme might work.

Guiding principles
  • Aim for what’s best for the country.
  • Aim to compensate sectors for losses incurred.
  • Aim to give consumers choice about which businesses to support within each expenditure category.
The starting point is the sums that Government would otherwise spend on bailing out businesses hit my covid-19. 

Categories are broad, partly for simplicity, partly because coupon-holders should be able to choose between providers of services. Coupon-holders can choose within categories. All coupons are tradeable and exchangable. I would assume that all businesses have barcode or QR scanners but that many consumers don't.
  • I suggest as examples of categories: 
  • Air travel
  • Surface travel
  • Personal services (hair, nails, massage, body-piercing, tattoos, any similar one-to-one service) 
  • Hospitality 
  • Private healthcare, including dentistry
Expenditure statistics per UK household for 2019 are given here. To some extent categories will be decided by the statistics available. 

Example: The ONS says each UK household spends £51.30* per week on restaurants and hotels. Rather than try to assess and then compensate each business for any lost income, I suggest giving each household coupons worth 104 times £51.30* = £5335 to be spent on restaurants and hotels, within the UK, within the next two years. 
*Bear in mind that the UK Government's aim is to compensate UK business, so a sum representing expenditure on overseas hospitality would have to be subtracted from the £51.30 

There are other aspects that would need discussion. In particular, the entitlements of each household should be broken down to adults and children. 

The scheme would be more complex and more contentious than the likely government plan of direct compensation to big business. But, in my view, if properly done, its advantages could outweigh the disadvantages. The advantages, as outline in my previous post, are mainly that it would stimlate competition, and help small businesses. It would also benefit consumers who aren't interested in, for example, air travel who could swap their coupons for a smaller amount of cash or for other services that they want or need. Under this scheme, an adult could exchange their air travel coupon for a coupon for childcare or private dentistry.

10 May 2020

The Coronavirus Bailout - an alternative suggestion


[This was published as a letter to the Editor of the Financial Times on 12 May, 2020. It has nothing to do with Social Policy Bonds!]

Already, it looks big businesses are are preparing their appeals for bailouts from governments all over the world, to compensate for income lost because of COVID-19. And, most likely, they'll get them. These titans of industry and their pals in government everywhere are probably already drafting the terms. I think we can foresee the result: more industry concentration, and a further widening of the gap between the rich and well connected on one side, and small businesses and ordinary people on the other. 

Here’s another idea. If we want to keep competitive markets going, give people rather than politicians the opportunity to choose who stays in business. Instead of lavishing enormous sums on favoured giants, let people have some say as to where taxpayers' cash should go. Take the total national expenditure on things like aviation, hospitality, and personal services, divide it by the number of people in the country, and issue coupons worth that much to each adult, to be spent on that service or product. So, if the average sum spent by an adult on air travel in the UK, say, was £200 last year, give each adult a coupon worth that sum, with the stipulation that it be spent on air travel over the next two years. Make the coupons tradeable, so that those of us who don’t want to fly can exchange them for cash or swap them for a couple of sessions at a body piercing salon, or a few weeks’ high street cappuccinos.

The alternative and, unfortunately, the more likely scenario, will be a form of central planning, in which government lavishes taxpayer funds on its favourites in exchange for some degree of control. We know what that will mean: inefficient, bloated and corrupt industries-- and yet more cynicism. Instead, tradeable coupons for purchases of designated coronavirus-hit services would restore some much-needed competition and consumer power.

My next post goes into a bit more detail about this suggestion. 

27 April 2020

Why no Social Policy Bonds?

Why have Social Policy Bonds not been issued?

Contrast Social Policy Bonds with Social Impact Bonds, now being issued in about 25 countries. SIBs are the non-tradeable version of Social Policy Bonds. While tradeability sounds like a technical detail, it actually has a few critical implications about which I have written here and here.

A major difficulty with issuing Social Policy Bonds is that they don't readily lend themselves to experimentation; small-scale trials over a limited geographic area, which are short term in nature. Neither do they show much advantage over conventional policy when we already (roughly) know how to achieve a specified social goal. For instance: take the goal of improving a lake's water quality. We could issue Social Policy aiming to reduce the levels of pollutants in the water. But, if the main sources of pollution are easy to identify, then there is no need to introduce middlemen, in the form of bond traders and investors in the bonds, to achieve that which regulation or taxes on polluters could do more simply.

No, where Social Policy Bonds work best is when we don't know how to achieve the goal, and where there is time for different approaches to be tried, the failures terminated, and the more promising ones implemented: goals that will require diverse (over different areas) and adaptive (varying with time) approaches, and a mix of them. That's what governments find difficult, but it's what is necessary to achieve broad, long-term, complex goals, such as ending war, or achieving universal literacy.

But when we basically know how to achieve a goal, Social Policy Bonds aren't necessary. In the lake example, and  assuming we are talking of a time frame of no more than a few years, regulation or polluter-pays taxation would achieve our goal without the need for an untried, controversial, and somewhat unconventional financial instrument. With a broader goal— something like improving an entire country's inland water quality— and over a longer time period then a bond regime could play a useful role. There would be time for motivated bondholders to research, experiment and continuously refine an array of approaches, optimised for time and space, to achieve the goal as cost-effectively as possible.


The danger is that applying Social Policy Bonds in ways that don't show their advantages over other, simpler, approaches will taint the concept. People would then see the bonds as a fancy means of enriching intermediaries (bondholders, financial market players), rather than a solution to social problems. (This might be happening with SIBs.) If there is anything society doesn't need, it's a financial services sector enriching itself still further by sucking the best mathematical brainpower out of the real economy, and contributing nothing of social value.

14 April 2020

Le risque, ce n'est pas la mort de Schengen

The confusion between ends and means lies at the heart of our political systems. Here, the French President tells us what matters to him:
'Le risque, c’est la mort de Schengen'
The risk is the death of Schengen. Emmanuel Macron is certain: the foundations of the European Union (EU) are in danger owing to the epidemic of new coronavirus which strikes the Old Continent. l'Opinion, 27 March
Actually I think most of us would rate the risk of thousands of people dying as more significant than that of having to impose national border controls. I am sure Mr  Macron means well. But the EU project is a means to certain ends; peace and prosperity, most importantly. It is not an end in itself. Nor is 'proportion of energy derived from renewables' a valid, meaningful end. Nor, more fundamentally, is Gross Domestic Product. 

Social Policy Bonds have several advantages over our current ways of making policy. One is the way they would channel society's scarce resources into the most efficient ways of achieving social and environmental goals. But another is that they compel us to think about what those goals really are. If the goal, for instance, is to maintain a borderless European Union, or to keep the Euro going, then those are entirely different goals from improving the health and well-being of EU citizens. To an alarming degree, they are in conflict. There are plenty of other examples: school attendance, for instance, however measured, is not a social goal: better educational outcomes are. Shorter hospital waiting lists, or more mammography screenings, are not a social goal: better health outcomes are.

The failure of our leaders to distinguish between means and ends is disastrous. It has led to a widening gap between government and the people whom is supposed to serve. The results, throughout the democratic countries, are becoming all too clear: a widespread disenchantment with conventional politics, a growing cynicism and despair over government ever being able to deliver what ordinary people want and need. Social Policy Bonds, by channelling society's resources into the achievement of agreed, verifiable, meaningful social goals are one way in which we might begin to close that gap. 
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I have repaired the broken links at the Social Policy Bonds main website including, most importantly, the links to pdfs of the chapters in the definitive book.

13 April 2020

SocialGoals.com: housekeeping

I have repaired the broken links at the Social Policy Bonds main website including, most importantly, the links to pdfs of the chapters in the definitive book.

02 April 2020

Preparing for disaster

This is a topical introduction to my paper on Disaster Prevention Bonds.

It’s easy to criticize governments for not being prepared for the coronavirus pandemic. But consider what preparing for a pandemic actually means. Thousands of hospital beds lying empty for most of the year, nurses and doctors on standby waiting for a crisis that might never happen. Testing kits, protective clothing, vaccine manufacturing capabilities unused in a sterile storage facility, and deteriorating with time…. And what’s so special about a pandemic? Why should we not prepare against other disasters that might arise with equal or greater probability?

An electromagnetic pulse, an asteroid hitting earth, a volcanic supereruption? The truth is that the best our governments do is react to something that actually happens. Our problem is not that governments are slow, reactive, blundering, doing too little—or too much—too late. It is that governments or supranational bodies like the World Health Organization are not necessarily the best bodies to trust with disaster preparedness. (Indeed, once this crisis is over, the WHO’s role in refusing to consider lessons from Taiwan needs to be looked at very carefully. It’s clear already, though, that in common with most other organisations of any kind, the WHO is at least as interested in self-perpetuation as in the health of the world’s population. ) So what is the problem with government, especially government at levels high enough to deal effectively with national or global disasters?
  •  It has few incentives to watch out for disasters and react quickly and preemptively.
  •  It’s is slow to react to crises, it prefers top-down, one-size-fits-all solutions, and is very slow to adapt its policies to changing circumstances.
  • It has short time horizons, and though its individual members will be hard-working and well intentioned, it has no no incentive to correct its deficiencies.
  • It is often concerned to prioritise actions that deal with visible problems at the expense of those that are too slow moving or unglamorous for television. Better solutions would not focus on appearances at the expense of societal well-being.
  •  Related to the previous point—and of particular relevance to the current pandemic—a government will over-react to problems that have an immediate, visible impact. Such an over-reaction might be more detrimental to societal well-being than the crisis. 
In relation to this last point, a government over-reaction—the cure being worse than the disease—might have a baleful impact in the longer term too if, when faced with another serious threat, government, remembering previous over-reaction and the consequent public backlash, under-reacts. Disaster Prevention Bonds, in my view, would deal with all these weaknesses of humanity's current approach to disaster preparation.